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A LEGAL APPROACH TO EQUITABLE SERVITUDES

Ralph A. Newman*

T

HE variety of conceptions of the nature of equitable servitudes 1 is
only one indication of the complexity of this particular branch of
the law; the difficulty of classifying the topic as a branch of equity
rather than of real property, or the reverse, is another, and one which
grows out of the interplay of both of these divisions of the law upon the
particular field of equitable servitudes. The following discussion is
designed to indicate that many of the difficulties inherent in the concept of equitable servitudes may be resolved by analyzing the subject
from the point of approach of the parent concept, covenants running
with the land at law.
Since early times it has been well established that covenants, to run
with the land, must touch or concern the land itself. It was so held in
Spencer's Case,2 decided in 1583. But even before that the statute of 32
Henry VIII, in I 540, passed in order to assure to the Crown and its
favorites the perpetuation of the privileges accruing from the rape of
the monasteries, attached the character of succession to both rights and
obligations created by the landlord and tenant relationship. And even
earlier, the doctrine of covenants in deeds, running with the land, had
its being. 8
The essential requirement of covenants running with the land has
never been more concisely expressed than by Best, J., in Vyvyan v.
Arthur,4 where he said that the covenantee must be benefited only because of his continuing owner of the dominant estate; othei;-wise the
covenant is only a collateral covenant on which the assignee cannot sue.

* A.B.,

LL.B., Harvard. Assistant.Professor of Law, St. John's University; on

leave as Trial Examiner, National Labor Relations Board.-Ed.
1 Cf. Stone, "The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract,"
18 CoL. L. REv. 291 at 296-297, 300-302 (1918), 19 id. 177 (1919), advocating
the explanation of a tortious interference with contract rights; Ames, "Specific Performance for and against Strangers to the Contract," 17 HARV. L. REv. 174 ( 1904),
unjust enrichment theory; Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 HARV.
L. REV. 813 (1920), real property explanation; Abbott, "Covenants in a Lease which
Run with the Land," 31 YALE L. J. 127 at 131 (1921), "privity of conscience" theory.
2 5 Coke 16a ( 158 3). And see historical discussion in Norcross v. James, 140
Mass. 188, 2 N. E. 946 (1885).
8 Pakenham's Case, Y.B. 42 Edw. III, 3, pl. 14 (1368). Additional cases are
cited in CLARK, REAL CovENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH LAND"
85, note 31 (1929).
4 I B. & C. 410, 107 Eng. Rep. 152 (1823).
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Proper criteria for determining whether the covenant touches or concerns the land have been adequately stated by Professor Bigelow. 5 It
must be borne in mind, however, that that writer's treatment, as do
so many others, including even the penetrating discussion by Tiffany,6
includes in the same discussion both legal covenants and equitable servitudes. The case which is generally considered to have originated the
doctrine, Tulk v. Moxhay,7 although decided as an equitable servitude,
was clearly a covenant running with the land at law, and could have
been decided on that ground.
The requirement of privity of estate in the creation of covenants
running with the land at law means simply that the covenant must be
contained in: an instrument conveying an estate in land from the covenantee to the covenantor. From this requirement, plus the requirement
that the covenant must benefit the covenantee only because of his
ownership of the dominant estate,8 we find the following to be the essential characteristics of a covenant running with the land:
The covenant must be created by express language.
The covenant must be contained in a conveyance of an interest in land.
3. The estate so burdened must have been conveyed by the
covenantee at the time of the execution of the covenant.
4. .The burdened estate must have been owned by the covenantor at the time of the execution of the covenant.
5. The covenantee mµst at the time of the execution of the
covenant retain the land to be benefited thereby.
6. The plaintiff must own the dominant tenement at the time
of suit ( since the right created by the covenant is only the right to
benefit from the use of the land for the benefit of which the covenant was executed).
7. By definition and a corollary of 2, the covenant must bur. den land, not chattels.9
I.
2.

5 "The Content of Covenants in Leases," I2 MICH. L. REv. 639 (1914). They
may be summarized :as meaning the legal relations of the parties with and without the
covenant.
8 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 858 et seq. (1939).
7 z Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. II43 {1848). The same conclusion had been
reached previously in Whatman v. Gibson, 9 Simons 196, 59 Eng. Rep, 333 (1838).
8 Supra, at note 4s CLARK, REAL CoVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN W1TH LA.No"
74 (1929), has a somewhat similar classification comprising four heads: (1) form, (2)
intention, (3) nature of the promise ("touching or concerning" the land), and (4)
privity.
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These' are the characteristics of covenants running with the land at
law reduced, to borrow a phrase of mathematics, to their lowest terms.
Given the above factors, we will find a covenant running with the land,
the benefit of w}:lich will pass with a conveyance of the dominant tenement and the burden of which will attach as against any transferee of
the burdened land, or servient tenement, whether he be purchaser for
value without notice, or donee, or taker with notice of the covenant.10
The equitable enforcement of the legal rights so created will be governed by the ordinary rules determining the exercise of the equitable
jurisdiction, depending chiefly on the adequacy of the legal remedy.
However, we find also that equity will recognize, provided that
no transfer of the servient tenement has been made to a purchaser for
· value without notice, that the burden of the covenant passes in cases
other than those which, because of the presence of all of the above
factors, fall within the classification of covenants running with the land
at law. This being the case, we can determine by a priori reasoning what
situations may exist which (beca~se falling outside the field of covenants running with the land at law by reason of the absence of one or
more of the requirements of that concept) will present the problem
whether equity will itself create a right. If equity is enforcing, not a
legal right, but an equitable one, the enforcement will be determined in
no manner by the inadequacy of the legal remedy, but in accordance
with the rules of the exclusive equity jurisdiction. But if the law, reversing the usual sequence in a manner by no means novel, adopts such
equitable rights,11 the equitable enforcement of the right may be governed either by the rules pertaining to the concurrent jurisdiction or, if
the analogy of express trusts be followed,12 by the rules of the exclusive
equity jurisdiction.
From the foregoing analysis into its component parts of the concept
of covenants running _with land, we can predict that situations may arise
presenting the question whether the burden of a restrictive covenant
will pass with the transfer of the burdened land, in cases where any one
10 Renals v. Cowlishaw, 9 Ch. Div. us (1878), 11 id. 866 (1879); Equitable
Life Assurance Society v. Brennan, 148 N.Y. 661, 43 N.E. 173 (1896).
11 As to tlie right of contribution between sureties, Norton v. Coons, 3 Den.
(N.Y.) 130 (1846), the law courts have borrowed their jurisdiction from the courts of
equity, as explained in Matthews v. Aikin, I N.Y. 595 (1848}; and note dictum in
Bull v, Burton, 227 N.Y. IOI, 124 N. E. 111 (1919), that it is immaterial whether
or not the covenantee retained the land. Note also the analogy of recognition at law of
the right of damage for breach of trust, formerly within the exclusive jurisdiction of
equity.
12 See 2 ScoTr, TRUSTS, § 199.2 (1939).
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of the requisite elements of covenants running with the land is lacking.
All of the cases establishing the existence of equitable servitudes fit,
without overlapping,13 into this pattern. That is, one or more of the
elements of covenants running with the land are absent. A single qualification results from the nature, not of equitable servitudes but of the
equity jurisdiction, and will be explained presently. However, in all
cases of equitable servitudes, the court has required some substitute for
the missing legal element.
We find accordingly,'as was to be anticipated, in the class where the
first element, an express restriction, is missing, the building scheme
cases such as Tallmadge v. East River Bank, 14 where the restriction is
created by conduct or general understanding. In that c~se one Davis,
who owned all the frontage on both sides of Eighth Street, New York
City, between S~cond and Third Avenues, built several houses on both
sides of the street with eight-foot setbacks devoted to doorsteps and
areas inclosed in iron fences. Prospective purchasers were always shown
this plan, as had been done in the case of sales of lots to the plaintiffs.
After the sales to the plaintiffs, Davis sold two lots to one Wilkes,
showing him the plan or diagram. Defendant purchased from a mesne
grantee of Wilkes, with notice of the claimed restrictions. It was held
that he took the lots subject to the restrictions.
In the recent case of Pica v. Cross County Construction Corporation,15 where an owner had constructed on a tract three buildings which
were served by a common water supply pipe, the grantee of one of the
buildings was held to be entitled to an implied easement in the pipe
against grantees of the other two buildings who contended that they
had had no actual notice, although the pipes entering their buildings
were visible. The agreement in this case was never put into words at
all, on the severance of the land which had been held in common
ownership. Under such circumstances no covenant running with the
land could have existed because of the absence of express agreement.
Since Tallmadge v. East River Bank and Pica v. Cross County Construction Corporation were cases where there was no express agreement
they are instances of equitable servitudes and not of covenants run18 Professor Clark considers such overlapping as inevitable. CLARK, REAL CoVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RUN WITH LAND" 6 (1929).
14 26 N.Y. 105 (1862). See semble, Dorr v. Harrahan, IOI Mass. 531 {1869);
Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass. 546 {1876). No seal is required, only written evidence.
Giddings, "Restrictions upon the Use of Land," 5 HARV. L. REv. 274 at 278 (1892), .
contradicting BROWNE, STATUTE OF FRAUDS, 4th ed.,§ 269 {1880).
1 ~ 259 App. Div. 128, 18 N.Y.S. (2d) 470 (1940).
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ning with the land, and are decided according to principles appropriate
to the former concept.
Coming to the second class, where the restriction is not contained
in a conveyance of an interest in land, we find cases of agreements
among adjoining landowners restricting for their mutual benefit the
use of their property, as for example Johnson v. Roberston.16 That
was a suit in equity to enjoin the defendant from erecting a building
which would interfere with the free use of a four-foot strip which, by
written agreement of the plaintiff and all the owners of the properties
fronting on Walnut Street, Des Moines, between Fifth and Eighth
Streets, had been reserved for broadening the sidewalk an additional
four feet. No land was conveyed by the agreement from any owner to
any other owner. The court enforced the agreement, at the suit of a
tenant of one of the parties to the agreement, during the remainder of
the term of his lease against a purchaser with notice from another
signer.
Since the restriction in Johnson v. Robertson was not in a conveyance of land, it is an equitable servitude and not a covenant running
with the land. The element of notice by the defendant was therefore
essential to justify the issuance of the injunction. Had the case concerned a covenant running with the land, notice would have been immaterial.11
In the third class, where the burdened estate was not acquired from
the covenantee at the time of the execution of the covenant, the cases
of implied reciprocal negative covenants, is Sanborn v. McLean. 18 In
that case a number of lots on Collingwood Avenue, Detroit, were
platted sqlely for residential purposes. The owners, Robert and Joseph
McLaughlin, originally deeded some of the lots with express restrictive
covenants. Title to the lots owned by the defendant was derived
through mesne conveyances from a deed by the McLaughlins dated
later than the deeds which had contained express covenants, a_nd which
16
17

156 Iowa 64, 135 N. W. 585 (1912).

See also Taite v. Gosling, II Ch. Div. 273 (1879). For other cases involving
neighborhood plans, see CLARK, REAL CoVENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH
"RuN WITH LAND" 149, notes 3 and 4, 151, note II (1929); also 21 A. L. R. 1281
at 1306-1324 (1922); 33 A. L. R. 676 (1924); Shoyer v. Mermelstein, 93 N. J. Eq.
57, II4 A. 788 (1921), noted 20 MICH. L. REV. II9 (1921); Sanborn v. McLean,
233 Mich. 227, 206 N. W. 496 (1925), noted IO MINN. L. REV. 619 (1926); 33
HARV. L. REv. 813 at 819 (1920); 5 MINN. L. REv. 486 (1921); Stone, "The
Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract," 19 CoL. L. REv. 188 at
189 (1919), And cf. Pudding v. Vielbig, 103 N. J. Eq. 39, 142 A. 171 (1928),
noted 27 MICH. L. REv. 222 (1928).
18
233 Mich. 227, 206 N. W. 496 (1925).
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contained no such restrictions. Plaintiff's adjoining lot was similarly
obtained, through a deed without restrictions, from a common owner,
part of whose land had subsequently been conveyed to defendants. It
was held that the notice which defendant had from a view of the premises, indicating the general plan, bound him by a reciprocal easement. Although it is somewhat doubtful whether, as the court says, the
restrictions in prior deeds of record charged the defendant with constructive notice, since they were not in his chain of title, he was nevertheless charged with the duty of inquiry as to the existence of a building plan, creating obligations similar to those which would· have resulted from an e},._'Press covenant with the defendant's immediate
grantor. 19
Since Sanborn v. McLean does not meet the requirements of a
legal covenant, the burdened estate not having been conveyed from the
covenantee at the time of execution of the covenant, it is a case of equitable servitude only, and notice was a materiaJ element.
An extension of the doctrine of Sanborn v. McLean is found in
Schmidt v. Palisade Supply Company,2° where it was held that a reciprocal negative easement bound land acquired by the convenantee, the
developer, subsequently to the conveyance to the plaintiff.
In the fourth class, where the burdened _estate was not owned by
the covenantor at the time of the creation of the covenant, is Lewis v.
Gollner. 21 In that case Gollner, after contracting to buy a lot on which
he intended to build a seven-story flat, orally agreed in consideration
of the payment of $6,000 by plaintiff and other property owners in the
neighborhood, that he would not contract to build any apartment houses
in the immediate neighborhood, and assigned his contract to the neighbors. Immediately thereafter he purchased another lot in the same
vicinity and began to construct an apartment house, and later, after
having been threatened with an injunction suit, conveyed the property
to his wife, who knew all the facts. The court sustained an injunction.
Hei;-e no "servient tenement" existed at the time of the agreement, and
there was therefore no land with which the agreement could run, but
the agreement attached nevertheless to land which was subsequently
acquired by the promisor. Possibly the court may have been influenced
19 For. a similar case, see Tuttle v. Ohio Boulevard Co., 245 Mich. 188, 222 ,N.
W. 171 (1928).
20 (N.J. Eq. 1912) 84 A. 807.
21 129 N.Y. 227, 29 N. E. 8_1 (1891).
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in its decision by the fact that the owner of the land was the wife of the
covenantor.
Since in Lewis v. Gollner the burdened estate was not owned by
the covenantor at the time of the execution of the covenant, the case
involves an equitable servitude rather than a covenant running with
the land, and is decided in accordance with corresponding principles.
It will be observed that in several of the cases involving equitable
servitudes more than one of the factors comprising the elements essential to the concept of covenants running with the land may be absent.
Thus, in both Sanborn v. McLean, where the burdened estate was not
transferred to the promisor by the promisee at the time of foe creation
of the restriction,· and in Lewis v. Gollner, where the burdened estate
was not owned by the promisor at the time of the creation of the restriction, there was also absent the factor of creation of an estate by express
language. We have already seen, however, as in Tallmadge v. East
River Bank, that the last-mentioned factor is not an essential element
in equitable servitudes.
The fifth class of cases is illustrated by Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corporation,22 where the Wittnauer Realty Co., Inc. owned adjoining parcels at 560 and 562-568 West End Avenue, New York
City. On July 7th, 1920, it conveyed parcel No. 562-568 to the Alwyn
Improvement Corporation, taking back a purchase-money mortgage.
Later in the same day, according to the complaint, it conveyed No.
560 to Vogeler, with a restriction against building higher than fifty
feet from the sidewalk level without the consent of both the Alwyn
Improvement Corporation and of the adjoining owner. The Special
Term of the Supreme Court rendered a declaratory judgment in favor
of the plaintiff to the effect that the restrictions were not enforceable
in equity in favor of the adjoining parcel, No. 562-568 West End Avenue. The judgment was affirmed by the Appellate Division. The Court
of Appeals, in reversing the judgment of the Appellate Division, held
· that Vogeler's property was subject to the restriction. Here the "dominant tenement" was not owned by the covenantee at the time of the
grant to Vogeler, but the interest in that property retained by the Wittnauer Realty Co., Inc., through its ownership of the purchase-money
mortgage, plus its expressed intent, were held sufficient to supply the
defect in the restriction, namely that no land was retained by the covenantee at the time the restriction was created, which defect would have
22

247 N.Y. 131, 159 N. E. 886 (1928).
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presented an insurmountable impediment to the .enforcement of the
restriction as a covenant running with the land.
Since in Vogeler v. Alwyn Improvement Corporation the promisee
did not own or retain, at the time of the creation of the restriction,· land
benefited thereby, it is a case for the application of the rules applying
to equitable servitudes and not to covenants running with the land.
The requirement of the sixth class, that the plaintiff must own the
benefited land at the time of suit, results from the nature of the concept of covenants running with the land, namely that the rights created
by the covenant must be rights which result from the us~ of the land
for the benifit of which the covenant had been executed.
In view of the relaxing in equity of the strict requirements of the
doctrine of covenants running with the land as exemplified in the first
five classes, we would expect to find similarly that the requirement
that the plaintiff must own the benefited land at the time of suit would
not be considered essential in equitable servitudes. We fail to find,
however, in this class, a settled doctrine of dispensing with the requirement of a dominant tenement in the plaintiff's ownership at the time of
suit; although if the harm be present, as it certainly was in Borough
Bill Posting Co. v. Levy,2 3 it is difficult to understand, other than for
historical reasons, why equity should hesitate to take at this point the
only remaining step necessary to complete the pattern. Dean Stone has
· argued 2 with controlling force that there is no reason why such a requirement should be observed in equity other than the fact that the
requirement -existed at the time of Sir Edward Coke. The weight of
authority is still, however, contra. St. Stevens Protestant Episcopal
Church v. Church of the Transfiguration, 25 which presented the problem, was decided on another ground; but the point was squarely decided in Orenberg v. Johnston. 26 In that case a religious corporation
conveyed all its property, consisting of its church, to defendant, who
agreed to maintain the clock tower in its present location or in an
equally desirable one to be approved by the municipal authorities.
Defendant contracted to convey to plaintiff free from encumbrances
other than one not material to the issue. The purchaser rejected title
and brought suit to recover his down payment. The court denied rescis,1

144 App. Div. 784, 129 N.Y.S. 740 (19II).
Stone, "The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers· to a Contract," 18
CoL. L. REv. 291 at 313 (1918).
25 201 N.Y. 1, 94 N. E. 191 (1911); the c~urt found that the restrictive covenant was inserted in plaintiff's deed without the consent of its officers.
26 269 Mass. 312, 168 N. E. 794 (1929).
23

24
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sion because the covenantee owned no benefited property at the time of
suit 27 and the covenant therefore was enforceable and did not render
the title unmarketable.
Borough Bill Posting Co. v. Levy, which properly reached a contrary decision as to the necessity for such ownership, is not in accordance
with the weight of authority. 28 Korn v. Campbell 29 indicates the
reluctance of a higher court of the same state to go "all out" in recognizing the existence of an equitable primary right where the plaintiff
is not the owner of the dominant tenement, although the decision was
based on so unusual a ground that the case remains the exemplar of a
doctrine of the extinguishment of equitable servitudes on the subdivision of the burdened land, which is peculiar to the state of New
York.
Properly viewed, the seventh class, where the restriction burdens
chattels, not land, is not a situation comparable to covenants running
with the land, which doctrine by definition cannot of course include
restrictions affecting chattels. The class is included, however, for the
purpose of completing the equitable servitude pattern. Illustrations
of this class are abundant. We cite merely Murphy v. Christian Press
Assn. Pub. Co. 8° For further illustrations the reader is referred to an
article entitled "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels" by Professor Z.
Chafee, Jr.81
We might of course include at this point two additional possibilities,
eight and nine, contemplating respectively the situations where the restrictive agreement is mad~ by one who never acquired land to be burdened by it, and where there was no land which was ever b_enefited by
the restrictive agreements. The statement of the hypothesis with refer27 Congleton v. Pattison, IO East 130, 103 Eng. Rep. 725 (1808); Formby v.
Barker, [1903] 2 Ch. 539; Werner v. Graham, 181 Cal. 174, 183 P. 945 (1919);
Lincoln v. Burrage, 177 Mass. 378, 59 N. E. 67 (1901); London County Council v.
Allen, [1914] 3 K.B. 642; Los Angeles University v. Swarth, (C.C.A. 9th, 1901)
107 F. 798. Contra: Smith v. Gulf Refining Co., 162 Ga. 191, 134 S. E. 446
(1926); Van Sant v. Rose, 260 Ill. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913); Bald Eagle Valley Ry.
v. Nittany Valley Ry., 171 Pa. 284, 33 A. 239 (1895); Borough Bill Posting Co. v.
Levy, 144 App. Div. 784, 129 N.Y.S. 740 (1911).
28 See Graves v. Deterling, 120 N.Y. 447, 24 N. E. 655 (1890); Van Sant v.
Rose, 170 Ill. App. 572 (1912), affd. 260 Ill. 401, 103 N. E. 194 (1913).
29 192 N.Y. 490, 85 N. E. 687 (1908). Semble: King v. Dickeson, 40 Ch. Div.
596 (1889); Dane v. Wentworth, l I I Mass. 291 (1873); Wright v. Pfrimmer, 99
Neb. 447, 156 N. W. 1060 (1915). See also cases cited by CHAFEE and SIMPSON,
CASES oN EQUITY, N.Y. ed., 398, note 13 (1939).
so 38 App. Div. 426, 56 N.Y.S. 597 (1899).
81 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928). See also John Brothers Abergarw Brewery
Co. v. Holmes, [1900] 1 Ch. 188.
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ence to the 'first of these assumed classes refutes, however, the possibility
of its existence, since otherwise the. obligation of the promise could not
according to contract law pass without express assumption, at least without a still further extension of the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox 82 than
that to which Cardozo, J. ·referred in Bristol v. Woodward; 88 and
there can be no class nine, unless the concept of equitable servitudes
were to be carried far beyond its present state of adopting the definition
of covenants running with the land to the yrtent that the covenant
must benefit the covenantee by reason of his ownership of land.
V~rious explanations have been _advanced as to why in situations
in the first five classes the quality of succession attaches in equity to both
the rights and obligations arising out of the agreement.
In Tulk v. Moxhay, 84 the matrix case, Lord Cottenham adopted a
combination of the theory of tortious interference with a contract right an
and the unjust enrichment theory, applying the latter theory by reason
of the fact that the covenantor, if permitted to break his promise,
would I;>e benefited, at the expense of the covenantee, by the higher
resale value of the property.88 The first of these explanations has been
adopted by Dean Stone.37 The unjust enrichment explanation has been
favored by Dean Ames.38 Jolly 39 regards the rule as sui generis. The
conclusion reached by Dean Pound 40 as to the real property natur~ of
the restriction has been forcefully supported by Cardozo, J., in Bristol
v. Woodward,41 after previous intimations of this basis of the doctrine
20 N.Y. 268 {1859).
251 N.Y. 275, 167 N. E.,441 (1929). And see 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,
3d ed., § 867 (1939); 12 CoL. L. REV. 158 (1912).
84 2 Phillips 774, 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (1848).
8 ~ ". • • ~he question is, not whether the covenant runs with the land, 'but
whether a party shall be permitted to use the land in ·a manner inconsistent with the
contract entered into by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased." 2 Phillips at 777-778.
86 "Of course, the price would be affected by the covenant, and nothing could be
more inequitable. than that the original purchaser should be able to sell the property
the next day for a greater price, in consideration of the assignee being allowed to
escape from the liability which he h~d himself undertaken." 2 Phillips at 778.
87 Stone, ''The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to a Contract," 18
CoL. L. REV. 291 (1918), 19 id. 177 (1919).
88 Ames, "Specific Perf~rm;nce for and against Strangers to the Contract," 17
HARV. L. REV. 174 (1904).
89 JoLLY, RESTRICTIVE CovENANTS I (1909).
40 Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 HARV, L. REV. 813
(1920).
41 251 N.Y. 275 at 284, 167 N. E. 441 (1929).
82

88
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in Mattikow v. Sudarsky.42 The refutation of the theory of a tortious
interference with contract rights has been conclusively advanced by
Professor Chafee 43-the doctrine of Lumley v. Guy 44 does not permit
holding the second subpurchaser of restricted chattels on the theory of
the tortious interference with the plaintiff's contract right, even when
the doctrine is extended to include nonintentional interference; and a
corresponding legal principle should govern the enforcement of restricted land. The result could be explained only on the cumbersome
theory of an implied contract to exact a similar contract from the subpurchaser, an. artificial implication particularly undesirable in contracts
affecting real property. The traditional explanation of In re Nisbet &
Potts'. Contract,4 5 that the case was necessarily decided as it was because
of the real property nature of the servitude, breaks down when we
observe that even a contract right could not be cut off by the running of
the prescriptive period unless a right of action had arisen for its
breach.46 It is the absence of such a right of action which is usually
relied upon to sustain the interpretation that the court must have found
the right of the claimant to have been an interest in land. Even without
the aid of this theory, however, we are nevertheless brought to the conclusion that the explanation in greatest harmony with general real
property and contract doctrine is that an interest has been created in the
land itself.47
The effect of the various theoretical bases of the doctrine of equitable servitudes on the applicability of the statute of frauds has been
resolved at one stroke with almost Solomonic touch by Cardozo, J., in
Bristol v. Woodward. He pointed out that the doctrine, although
rooted in the real property concept, has also derived so strongly from
contract principles that it may now be impossible to characterize the
servitude for all purposes as entirely a property right or entirely the
result of contract rights; and that for purposes of determining the
applicability of the statute of frauds, the contract part of its origin may
control so as to bar the application of section 4 and its progeny. Dif42

248 N.Y. 404, 162 N. E. 296 (1928); and see 38 HARV. L. REv. 967 at 971
(1925).
43
Chafee, "Equitable Servitudes on Chattels," 41 HARV. L. REv. 945 (1928).
44
2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853).
45
[1905] I Ch. 391.
46
See Bordwell, "Disseisin and Adverse Possession," 33 YALE L. J. 285 at 292
(1924). Cf. 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 861 (1939).
47
Pound, "Progress of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 HARV. L. REv. 813 (1920);
London & S. W. Ry. v. Gomm, 20 Ch. Div. 562 (1882); and see Clark, "Equitable
Servitudes," 16 MICH. L. REv. 90 (1917).
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ficulties under other sections of the statute, occasioned for example by
the provision requiring a writing in the case of contracts not performable within a year, and also, as occasionally encountered, not performable within a lifetime, are dismissed, although not solved, only by
adopting Dean Pound's conclusion that a change of conditions within
the statutory period may terminate the restriction for all purposes.
Another possible field of difference between the concepts of covenants running with the land and equitable servitudes consists of affirmative covenants. This field has been reserved for separate treatment
because here the difference between the concepts results only from the
mechanical difficulties which were felt to limit the operative force of
the process of the common-law courts. Just as the only commop-law
easement requiring affirmative action by the owner was the spurious
common-law easement of fencing,4 8 the common law with similar and
characteristic conservatism has confined its recognition of affirmative
covenants running with the land to party-wall agreements, agreements
for the maintenance of cattle crossings, and covenants to repair, to pay
rent, to convey on the exercise of an option to purchase and for the
maintenance and repair of boundary fences. Here, according to Miller
v. Clary,4 9 the New York courts of equity have also rested, in accordance with the general doctrine of self-limitation which the courts of
that state have adopted because of their disinclination to enforce affirmative agreements. 50 In the instances mentioned, and that far only,
will the courts of New York specifically enforce affirmative covenants
affecting the use of land. Parenthetically, it may well be doubted
whether the court in Miller v. Clary did not perhaps unconsciously invent the additional factor supporting its decision, namely that the
agreement gave the promisee the right to enter upon the promisor's
property to repair the conduit. The difficulty of "continuous supervision" is of course merely an illusion. The court of equity does not
really supervise; it is the successful plaintiff who supervises, and it is
the function of the court to punish, in the proper case, for contempt of
its decree.
In general, however, courts of equity will more courageously
recognize the existence of an equitable right, and will in the exclusive
jurisdiction enforce it regardless of the affirmative nature of the coveClark, ''Equitable Servitudes," 16 M1cH. L.
3d ed., § 756 .(1939).
49 210 N.Y. 127, 103 I:-1- E. 1114 (1913).
5 ° Cf. Beck v. Allison, 57 N.Y. 366 (1874).
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nant, as in Whittenton Manufacturing Company v. Staples,5 1 where
the covenantor agreed to pay the covenantee or his assigns one-third of
the fl.owage damages caused by a reservoir dam. Similar decisions were
reached in Atlanta, K. & N. Railroad v. McKinney 52 and Clegg v.
Hands. 53
Another distinction, based also on the greater flexibility of the
equitable approach to the problem of the form of relief, appears in
respect to the restriction's termination. Does the equitable servitude
once created continue forever until cut off by a purchase for value without notice? A mere balance of "equities" in defendant's favor is not
enough.54 But when the character of the neighborhood changes,55 or
zoning ordinances or comparable legislation have rendered the restriction no longer necessary,5 6 the restriction is no longer enforceable in
equity,57 although in some states it still is at law.58 The inconsistency
of the latter doctrine, recognizing in effect the right of private condemnation, has been demonstrated by Dean Pound.59 When the original purpose can no longer be carried out, the right should be considered
terminated for all purposes. 60
164 Mass. 319, 41 N. E. 441 (1896).
124 Ga. 929, 53 S. E. 701 (1906).
53 44 Ch. Div. 503 (1890), a covenant to buy beer, indirectly enforced.
54 Evangelical Lutheran Church of the Ascension v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. 161, 172
N. E. 455 (1930).
55 Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 3II (1882).
56 Isaacs v. Schmuck, 245 N.Y. 77, 156 N. E. 621 (1927). Note the distinction
made in this case between changes in ordinances reasonably to be anticipated (e.g.,
residential into business), and those not reasonably to be anticipated (e.g., fireproof to
nonfireproof construction). See also Forstmann v. Jora Holding Co., 244 N.Y. 22, 154
N. E. 652 (1927).
57 Columbia College v. Thacher, 87 N.Y. 3II (1882).
58 Trustees of Columbia College v. Lynch, 70 N.Y. 440 at 453 (1877); Amerman v. Deane, 132 N.Y. 355, 30 N. E. 741 (1892); McClure v. Leaycraft, 193
N.Y. 36, 75 N. E. 961 (1904); Bull v. Burton, 227 N.Y. 101, 124 N. E. III
(1919); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed.,§ 861 (1939).
59 Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 1918-1919," 33 HARV. L. REv. 813 at
820-821, especially note 39 (1920).
6 ° CLARK, REAL CovENANTS AND OTHER INTERESTS WHICH "RuN \VITH LAND"
152-153, 163-165 (1929); 3 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., § 861 (1939); 4
L. Q. REv. I 19 ( I 8 8 8) ; Stone, "The Equitable Rights and Liabilities of Strangers to
a Contract," 18 CoL. L. REV. 291 (1918), 19 id. 177 (1919); Ames, "Specific Performance for and against Strangers to the Contract," 17 HARV. L. REV. 174 (1904).
See also 14 CoL. L. REv. 438 (1914); Pound, "The Progress of the Law, 19181919," 33 HARV. L. REv. 813 at 821 (1920). See also Postley v. Kafka, 213 App.
Div. 595, 2II N.Y.S. 382 (1925); 54 A. L. R. 812 (1928). Note Massachusetts
statute limiting restrictions to 30 years. Mass. Gen. Laws (1932), c. 184, § 23. No
balancing of equities doctrine is applicable. See CLARK, REAL CovENANTS AND OTHER
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Having ascertained the factors indispensable, according to the authorities, to the creation of an equitable servitude, that is, a promise
affecting the use or enjoyment of land or chattels, and ownership by
the plaintiff, at the time of suit, of property benefited by the promise,
and having ascertained, by observing the gaps in the classification of
rights created by the common law to enforce restrictive covenants,
where the necessity for equity to create additional rights can arise, we
are now in a position to determine the limits of the penumbra. of
situations where equitable servitudes exist. They exist where the restriction has not been created by express language; where the restriction
is not contained in a conveyance of an interest in land; where the burdened estate was not transferred to the promisor by the promisee at the
time of the creation of the restriction; where the burdened estate was
not owned by the promisor at the time of the creation of the restriction;
where the promisee does not own or retain at the time o_f the creatio11of the restriction, land benefited thereby; and where the restriction
burdens chattels, not land. Equitable servitudes cannot, on the weight
of authority, exist where the plaintiff does not own, at the time of suit,
property benefited by the promise; although on principle there should
be no such excision of this field from the operation of the doctrine. 01
This paper attempts nothing more ambitious than to chart the course of
examination of the problem of the existence of equitable servitudes;
limitations and extensions ~n addition to those illustrated by the decided
cases will no doubt appear from the unfathomable future stress of
social exigencies.
INTERESTS WHICH "RuN WITH LAND" 164 (1929); 37 YALE L. J. 832 (1927); 41
HARV. L. REV. 802 (1928).
61 See remarks of Scrutton, J., in London County Council v. Allen, [ 1914 l 3
K.B. 642.

